Monusco Forces in the Congo

As mentioned before we encountered Bangaldesh Monusco Forces a couple weeks ago at the botanical garden. Their General, who is stationed in Goma, was visiting his troops and took them to a little exploitation of the beautiful piece of rain forest by the river. They spend two hours wandering around in the botanical garden (which is more like a jungle that has a few paths), picking fruits and taking pictures… also with us : ) Right before they took us back to town in their trucks, each one of them posed in between Melaine and I – with sunglasses, which were exchange with whomever posed for the picture with us. I had encountered similar scenarios in India, were people everywhere seem very excited to have a white person on a photo with them. At any rate the Monucso troop took as back to town and actually dropped us up at our hotel. 

The UN troops which were sent over a decade ago, is the world’s largest UN peacekeeping mission, with currently over 20,000 troops deployed around the country. So far their mandate was very limited, as the UN tried to keep its neutrality and have observer status only – as MONUC force, and a bit more ability to intervene since July 2010 when MONUSCO was established. The big change came quietly over Eastern though, when the UN Security Council decided to send an ‘active fighting troop’ into the East of the Congo. 

The 3,000 men are supposed to stop the growth of the local rebel groups in eastern Congo, to neutralize them and take their weapons away. Starting in July it is a combination of South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian troops that taking action in the Congo – Countries that do not know civil war or the jungle. Furthermore these troops are supposed to operated alongside the Congolese Army – which have committed mass rapes and other severe breaches of human rights, and are known for switching sides to rebel groups…

The past attempts by the UN to take sided and action, haven’t been particularly successful. The UN Operation ‘Restore Hope’ that ended by US soldiers being shot and dragged through Mogadishu, Somalia was one. The recent attempt of the UN Operation to catch the head of the Lord Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, ended after multiple Guatemalan UN-Soldiers were killed by their own troops, was another. 

The ability of various UN troops to communicate and cooperate under one command seems incredibly difficult and at times impossible. The Bangladesh troops for example did not speak any French or Lingala, and even English was only spoken by a few. Here in Mbandaka we have further troops from Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nepal, and Cameroon. How they work together is not known to me …but that the Bangladesh commanding General (which was on his third mission in the Congo) didn’t even know neither that Mbandaka was in the Equateur region, nor that it was its capital, raises doubts.

Countries are well paid to send troops. Yet the quality of the troops and the actual soldiers pay seem low. In Mbandaka the UN troops hunted wild animals (one reason we have no more Hippos here) and in the East troops stole and sold gold, and got caught with a truck full of coltan on the Rwandan boarder.

The enormous mineral wealth in the East of the Congo, have lead to struggles for power and control of Congolese natural resources, and fueled the continued conflict that since 1996 has cost six million lives. The war also attracted several multinational companies and complex spheres of local, national and regional interests drawn by the relatively easy access to Congo’s natural resources, due to the conflict, further destroying infrastructure and “plunging the Congo into the world’s greatest humanitarian catastrophe” (Bertelsmann report 2012).

Division between indigenous people and migrants, create yet another significant source of conflict in the eastern regions. Instead of the UN troops however, the Bertelmans report advices: ‘The reform of the security sector, which is long overdue, as the ongoing conflict in parts of the Congo is because “the country lacks a reliable army, capable of monopolizing legitimate force”.

The report further states: “No measures have been thoroughly implemented to address the existing divisions or prevent cleavage-based conflicts from escalating. Political elites manipulate – and even exacerbate –existing tensions to shore up their own power. This has been the case in the eastern regions, where national elites aggravate ethnic tensions in tandem with local allies” and adds”

Reconciliation and justice between those perceived to be perpetrators and victims of past and ongoing injustices, and among different social communities within the Congo remain very crucial to a sustainable end of violence. The country’s political leadership has devoted no effective effort in this area.

 

In summary I can only re-emphasis the complexity of the conflict, and therefore the diversity of actions that need to be taken. The Congolese government and its key responsible persons are of major importance. Furthermore the UN troops seem to face great obstacles (which I will try to return to at a later point). Of course I hope that they will be successful in ending the conflict in the east once and for all with its new mandate starting in July, but in reality the likelihood is small…